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In the context of an era of great-power competition, understanding the 
main countries’ nuclear capabilities and strategy is vitally important.1 While 
dwarfed by Russian and US arsenals, China’s strategic arsenal is growing 
rapidly, and strategic thought in China is also evolving in response to a wide 
variety of factors. As with all nuclear powers, China is also actively relying 
on the space and cyber domains to serve its strategic goals. This issue brief 
will survey these elements.
China has a history of facing coercive nuclear diplomacy from the Cold War. 
Crises with the United States (Korean War both early and late as well as 
various crises involving the islands in the Taiwan strait in the 1950s) and the 
Soviet Union (most prominently in 1969) put China on the receiving end of 
nuclear threats with limited means to deter the then-superpowers. China’s 
nuclear arsenal historically has aimed to deter such threats in the future 
(and therefore, this permitted a policy of “no first use” to be at the center of 
China’s nuclear diplomacy, historically).
In 2020, the Pentagon provided its most precise assessment of the overall 
size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever: “China’s nuclear warhead stockpile 
[is] currently estimated to be in the low-200s.”2 This was a major revelation 
as most previous scholarly and think tank estimates had put the arsenal at 
50 percent higher than that figure. While representing only some 5 percent 
of the arsenal size of the United States or Russia (and smaller than France’s, 
as well), the subset of warheads within that overall number that can threaten 
the United States has grown about five-fold in the past twenty years, giving 
China the potential to contemplate new roles for its strategic force, beyond 
the barest “existential deterrence.”
This arsenal is deployed on a diverse set of land-based and submarine-
launched missiles. China’s missile force—both conventional and nuclear—is 
1 The views presented in this issue brief represent the author’s own personal views and not 
necessarily the views of any governmental office. This memo draws heavily on the author’s 
“China’s Nuclear Doctrine and Deterrence Concept,” in Paul Bolt and James Smith, eds., China’s 
Strategic Arsenal: Worldview, Doctrine, and Systems (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2021).
2 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020): p. ix.
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growing and (potentially more importantly) advancing 
in sophistication. Again, comparing to twenty years 
prior, there are major changes. Until the early 2000s, 
China’s main force to deter the United States was a 
few dozen liquid-fueled DF-5A intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) in fixed silos, and its only ballistic missile 
launching submarine did not patrol (neither routinely, nor—
perhaps—ever, given issues with its reactor).3 Today, China 
can threaten the United States with:
 ◆ a few dozen road-mobile DF-31 ICBM variants with 
solid-fuel propellant;
 ◆ a few dozen of the older DF-5 ICBM systems, still 
liquid fueled but now with multiple warheads (MIRVs)4; 
and
3 Liquid-fueled missiles generally are unfueled until immediately before firing and, because fueling a missile takes time, they are therefore more vulnerable to a 
first strike than their solid-fueled cousins, which can launch more swiftly.
4 China has long had the capacity to equip its missiles with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), but restrained in doing so until around 
2015. In part, this development serves as a means to overwhelm US missile defenses.
5 China has five Jin-class subs, with a sixth nearing completion. Each has a dozen tubes for modest ranged ICBMs.
6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress,” p. ix.
 ◆ a few dozen JL-2 missiles that could be launched from 
some of China’s more reliable Jin-class submarines.5
Today’s arsenal is a more survivable force to deter the 
United States. That said, given the growing US missile 
defense capabilities, discussed below, and continued 
limitations of its submarine force, China has some 
uncertainty regarding the viability of this deterrent force. 
That is one driver for continued modernization and 
development of China’s force.
In the same document cited above, the Pentagon also 
predicted “[o]ver the next decade, China’s nuclear 
warhead stockpile… is projected to at least double in size” 
and offers similar expectations for growth in warheads 
that could reach the United States.6 If true, the arsenal 
Military vehicles carrying DF-31A long-range missiles drive past the Tiananmen Gate during a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary 
of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2015. REUTERS/Jason Lee.
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will remain dwarfed by the US stockpile, and it is worth 
nothing that the US government has a record of expecting 
faster growth in China’s arsenal than actually comes to 
pass.7 Nevertheless it is clear that the overall arsenal 
and the number of systems that have the range to reach 
the United States will continue to grow. Notable systems 
include a road-mobile system capable of deploying 
multiple warheads (DF-41) and a longer-ranged submarine 
missile (JL-3). These systems will serve to increase the 
viability of China’s retaliatory capabilities, but they will 
enable other options.
China also maintains and is developing further a variety 
of shorter-ranged systems to cast nuclear shadows over 
other target sets beyond the continental United States. 
China has long had a significant number of solid-fueled 
systems (DF-15s and -21s) that might deter Russia and 
India and also hold at risk US forward bases in Asia. 
Just as with the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
force, this component of the arsenal is modernizing 
and expanding. Upgraded DF-21s and new DF-17 and 
-26s provide China with more accurate and numerous 
intermediate-ranged systems. Additionally, China is 
moving toward a triad by adding a strategic role to its air 
force, although the precise specifics remain uncertain.
As noted above, China proclaims its “no first use” 
(NFU) policy vigorously and frequently. While such 
declaratory policy should never be relied upon to gauge 
a country’s actual behavior in a serious crisis, it can 
be a way to conceptualize sizing requirements for the 
force in peacetime. Until recently, nearly all of China’s 
modernization and expansion fit comfortably in this role of 
creating a credible retaliatory force.
As any respectable defense planner would counsel, 
Chinese planners engage in “worst case analysis” of 
US capabilities. Three are particularly worrisome. First, 
precision-guided munition capabilities against its silo-
based force could nullify large numbers of Chinese 
warheads that are deliverable against the United States. 
Second, known acoustic vulnerabilities in Chinese 
submarines leave another significant portion of its arsenal 
7 For nearly a dozen examples on this point, see Hans Kristensen, “DIA Estimates For Chinese Nuclear Warheads,” Federation of American Scientists, May 31, 
2019, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/05/chinese-nuclear-stockpile/.
8 In 2009, the Office of Naval Intelligence published a chart depicting the relative acoustic quietness of Chinese SSBNs. If this assessment reflects Chinese 
perceptions, it would not enhance confidence of the survivability of those fifty-odd warheads.
9 See the team report I contributed to at Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, RAND Corporation, RR-1628-AF (Santa Monica, CA, 2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1628.html.
10 Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, and Christopher P. Twomey, “Of Bombs and Bureaucrats: Internal Drivers of Nuclear Force Building in China and the United 
States,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 28, No. 118 (July 4, 2019): 538–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1557945.
similarly at risk.8 Finally, China worries about the forty-
four ground-based missile defense interceptors, based 
mostly in Alaska, but also about the US Navy’s SM-3 block 
IIA systems that have a proven capability against ICBM-
velocity targets. Those systems might be enough, from 
Beijing’s perspective, to “mop up” any of its surviving 
force in the wake of a US preemptive attack (so as to 
enable US coercive leverage in an escalating conflict 
over Taiwan, presumably). Thus, China feels continuing 
pressure to modernize, diversify, and increase its forces to 
avoid such an outcome.9 Enhancing Chinese capabilities 
in all these areas (and particularly to overcome missile 
defenses) likely serves as important motivation for new 
systems like air launched ballistic missiles and hypersonic 
systems (DF-17).
Beyond that, however, there is clear evidence that this 
narrow emphasis is starting to change. There are the 
number of training regimens, emerging doctrinal and 
definitional discussions, and potential force posture 
developments, which raise questions about important 
shifts in China’s doctrinal approach. Evidence for these 
changes shows up in official reports about military 
exercises, in military training manuals, and within military 
newspaper stories. The main areas of focus are how to 
address conventional strikes against nuclear targets, 
the demand for early warning, how to train for rapid 
implementation of a nuclear attack, discussions of launch-
on-warning postures, the potential for nuclear weapons 
to deter conventional war, a discussion of trans-war 
deterrence, and the need for some degree of warfighting 
within a nuclear war. None of these has been codified 
in a declared nuclear policy, and the evidence is not 
overwhelming in any individual case. Many of these stem 
from bureaucratic influences and the 2015 reforms of 
the Chinese military.10 However, in the aggregate, these 
distinct changes suggest that a significant rethinking of 
the role of nuclear weapons is occurring within China. 
 ◆ The deliberate design of the DF-26 to be flexibly 
“dual capable” strongly suggests that China is trying 
to deter the United States from intense conventional 
war by use of a nuclear shadow through inadvertent 
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escalation. It should not be surprising that adversaries 
do not go to great lengths to make the world safe for 
their opponents to dominate with conventional forces. 
But this does raise concerns for the United States.
 ◆ It has become crystal clear that a major caveat must 
be acknowledged regarding the NFU stance in the 
face of conventional strikes on Chinese nuclear 
forces. Other ways that the boundaries of the NFU’s 
applicability have been blurred are also apparent. 
For instance, some evidence suggests that China 
might consider moving to a launch-on-warning or 
launch-on-threat posture. This raises some important 
questions: How would such warning be assessed? 
What capabilities do the Chinese have to differentiate 
between a nuclear and a non-nuclear attack? Indeed, 
such a scenario highlights a broader issue: What 
constitutes “use”?
 ◆ A number of Chinese sources suggest an increased 
perception in the value of nuclear weapons beyond 
mere deterrence of their use against China. The view 
that nuclear weapons somehow enhance China’s 
major power status is new and suggests a perception 
that they broadly contribute to China’s security, well 
beyond mere deterrence of an adversary’s nuclear 
attack.
 ◆ There is clearly increased Chinese thinking about 
and discussion of the ways nuclear weapons limit 
war. At the extreme, the change could be entirely 
consistent with a basic articulation of a modern NFU 
policy that views nuclear weapons as having only the 
circumscribed utility to limit wars from “going nuclear.” 
However, the contemporary Chinese discussions go 
further.
 ◆ Additionally, there are some signs that indicate that 
China’s traditionally relaxed view about the pace of 
retaliation necessary to achieve deterrence is starting 
to change and that China is looking for ways to ensure 
timely retaliation (or attack). At a broad strategic level, 
the changing emphasis on the speed of response 
is clear. All of this suggests a growing sense that 
Chinese nuclear forces need to be more responsive 
and flexible to achieve the country’s strategic goals. 
 ◆ Even more interesting is the emerging evidence of 
Chinese thinking about trans-war deterrence that 
raises a number of questions. Reserving a portion of a 
nuclear arsenal suggests that the actor at least thinks 
there is a chance of nuclear warfare being controlled 
and limited. Other authoritative sources focus on 
making deliberate choices about the scale of the 
nuclear response.
 ◆ Another aspect of China’s force development is the 
increasing accuracy of Chinese ballistic (and cruise) 
missiles. This raises additional questions about the 
potential for missile technology to contribute to some 
degree of warfighting in a nuclear conflict. Accuracy 
is not needed to hold the adversary’s cities at risk; it 
is, however, important to be able to either reduce the 
other side’s nuclear forces (particularly fixed silo-
based missiles) or attack key logistics nodes vital to 
supplying conventional forces.
A test launch of the Ground-Based Interceptor missile. US Air Force 
photo by Michael Peterson/Released. https://www.afspc.af.mil/News/
Article-Display/Article/731276/missile-defense-test-completed/. 
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 ◆ Finally, the shift in the organizational structure 
of the People’s Liberation Army has worrisome 
implications for the issue of nuclear use during 
conventional conflict. It is clear that the move toward 
joint force integration embodied in new, joint “theater 
commands” is a major undertaking. Yet there remain 
serious questions about the nature of the changes 
regarding missile forces that are entailed.
Beyond these developments in the nuclear arena, China is 
actively engaging in missile defense system development. 
China is developing its own midcourse intercept missile 
defense system and fields shorter ranged systems. Missile 
defense systems have proliferated throughout Asia, and 
there are strategic rationales for China to possess such 
a system in any conflict with India. (The United States, on 
the other hand, will be able to substantially overwhelm 
any Chinese missile defenses for the foreseeable 
future.) China also wants to deepen its understanding 
11 Thomas G. Roberts, “Unusual Behavior in GEO: SJ-17,” Aerospace Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 30, 2020, https://aerospace.
csis.org/data/unusual-behavior-in-geo-sj-17/; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Challenges to Security in Space,”  January 2019, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/
Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf.
of such systems to facilitate its own ability to deploy 
countermeasures to defeat them.
China is emerging as a major player in the militarization of 
space. Aside from its 2007 kinetic test of an antisatellite 
(ASAT) interceptor, the recently tested Chinese midcourse 
interceptor inherently has ASAT capabilities (as shown by 
the US destruction of a National Reconnaissance Office 
satellite with a SM-3 missile defense interceptor in the 
2008 Burnt Frost operation). China has also deployed 
a maneuvering satellite in geosynchronous orbit and is 
working on capabilities to address space debris that would 
have inherent weaponization potential.11 At the same time, 
China increasingly depends on space assets for both the 
conduct of its own military operations, especially any that 
are away from China’s home territories, and for economic 
advantages (through the Baidou global positioning 
system). Finally, it is worth emphasizing that China does 
not have a tradition of relying on early-warning satellites 
Military vehicles carrying DF-26 ballistic missiles travel past Tiananmen Gate during a military parade to commemorate the 70th 
anniversary of the end of World War II in Beijing Thursday Sept. 3, 2015. REUTERS/Andy Wong/Pool.
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 for launch-on-warning nuclear attacks. Although this is 
starting to change, such a doctrinal legacy likely means 
that China does not view attacks on space assets as 
escalatory in the same way the United States and Russia 
do.12 As China develops a greater reliance on space 
assets, this debate about offense-defense dominance and 
advantages will evolve. 
A final area that interacts with traditional strategic affairs 
is the cyber domain. While the Chinese have not deployed 
actual cyberattacks as aggressively as the Russians have, 
they have certainly been active collectors of intelligence.13 
More broadly, the Chinese military has highlighted the 
importance of information technology within both doctrinal 
discussions (the cumbersome “informationalization” term 
litters Chinese military writings and pronouncements) and 
organizational reforms (with the development of a nearly 
co-equal service with responsibility for such concepts, 
the Strategic Support Force). What this means for China’s 
nuclear strategy and posture is, however, rather opaque. 
Historically, China has not needed highly advanced 
command and control systems to implement its nuclear 
strategy. Again, this likely means that the Chinese do not 
view US strategic command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) systems as somehow sacrosanct, particularly as in 
many cases such systems would have relevance to both 
conventional and nuclear strikes. As noted above, China 
sees no obligation to contribute to the effectiveness of US 
conventional operations.
Stepping back, the major muscle movement of Chinese 
force modernization is explicable in the context of 
ensuring a robust, survivable retaliatory force against US 
escalation—potentially across the nuclear threshold—in 
a major conflict. That has the potential to create security 
dilemmas, generate arms races, and reify adversarial 
views. But even more worrisome are the emerging 
developments in the Chinese military that highlight 
additional roles for nuclear weapons that might expand 
such concerns.
12 On the importance of such legacies, see Christopher Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
13 Andy Greenberg, Sandworm: A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin’s Most Dangerous Hackers (New York: Anchor, 2019).
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